This paper refutes the pervasive claim that the separation of management from the board of directors is necessary to enhance board monitoring. Speci…cally, I develop a theoretical model of the relationship between a board and a CEO to compare two governance systems, one in which the board consists entirely of independent directors and the other in which the board consists of no independent directors. I show that the latter system produces stronger monitoring than the former system under a plausible condition: a private bene…t of a CEO being higher than a pay of each director. Moreover, the former system is interpreted as the U.S. system and the latter system is the traditional Japanese system. This motivates me to a further investigation of why have Japanese boards been claimed to monitor less than the U.S. boards. I provide an answer to this question by discussing Japanese governance system in light of its legal system and practices.
Introduction
This paper shows that boards that are separate from the CEO do not necessarily produce more monitoring than boards that are related to the CEO. 1 After a series of corporate scandals, the laws have been amended in many countries, including the U.S. and Japan, to remedy defects of the corporate governance systems that could not prevent abuses in management.
To be more precise, in order to prevent the future misconduct of CEOs, the number of independent directors has been increased to build boards that can produce strong monitoring. For simplicity, I de…ne independent directors as directors who are not allowed to become CEO, which is a concept contrasted with internal directors, whom I de…ne as directors serving on the board and quali…ed to become CEO. 2 Since no independent directors can become CEO while he is serving as independent, their presence on the board provides the opportunity to separate the board from management. This is one of the reasons why many policy makers and lawyers believe that the presence of independent directors will induce separation and hence enhance board monitoring of CEOs, so have incorporated them in laws.
My question is, does separation of the board and the CEO, generated by the presence of independent directors, always render the board a strong monitoring device? In other words, does shutting the channel to become CEO through the board of directors improve board's monitoring role? To address this issue, I consider two alternative systems; one whose board consists solely of independent directors and the other whose board consists solely of internal directors. Speci…cally, I consider substantive models for each case. That is, as the former system I consider the U.S. system, and as the latter system I consider the traditional Japanese system. 3 As a result of a comparison of the two alternative systems, I …nd that the answer to the question posed above is no; I …nd that the board with independent directors produces weaker monitoring as versus the board composed of all inside directors when the private bene…t 1 The term "Monitoring"in this paper is used to mean "learning CEO's talent"or "evaluating CEO decisions." I thank Eric Rasmusen for this point. However, in my model, in the case the board updates the CEO's talent by observing a bad signal, the expected corporate value is reduced. In this case, the board replaces the CEO. Therefore, having a low talent CEO can include the case in which the CEO does not act in favor of the company on purpose as well as the case in which the CEO has low management ability and reduce the company's pro…t by accident. 2 A considerable number of provisions exists concerning the de…nition of independent directors, but in this paper I do not discuss these in detail but instead, distil what is considered to be the quintessence from the provisions. More description is provided in section two of this paper. 3 I discuss the backgrounds of both systems in section two.
must always be appointed from the board of directors. In both systems, all directors act as one player, the board, and are responsible for monitoring the CEO, where the level of monitoring is determined by the board and the CEO, as in Hermalin and Weisbach [1998] .
I demonstrate that separation resulting from the adoption of independent directors does not necessarily reinforce board monitoring by inducing directors to monitor the CEO. Simply expressed, I contend the recent amendments in the laws of both countries do not always enhance board monitoring. The logic behind this …nding is as follows. In the model, I assume that the board objective is aligned to the pro…t of the …rm, which is a random variable dependent on the ability of the CEO. In period t, the initial board and the initial CEO determine the new board composition (which is later shown to have one-to-one correspondence with monitoring level). In period t + 1; the monitoring is performed by the new board of directors to update the ability of the initial CEO. 8 If a good signal is observed by the board, the initial CEO is retained, but if a bad signal is observed by the board, the initial CEO is …red and a new CEO is hired in period t + 2. Thus monitoring may induce an exchange of the initial CEO in period t + 2; under the U.S. system a new CEO is recruited from outside of the board; whereas under the traditional Japanese system a new CEO is recruited from inside of the board. I assume that there are always n + 1 players, speci…cally n directors and one CEO in both systems. Therefore, for the traditional Japanese system, in period t + 2; when the initial CEO is …red and one of the incumbent directors is promoted to be the new CEO, a new director is hired to maintain the number of players at n + 1. Then, in both systems, in period t + 3; a new player hired in period t + 2 (a new CEO for the U.S. system, and a new director for the Japanese system) receives his share replacing the initial CEO or the director serving at period t; and this is a loss of the expected payo¤ for the initial players serving at period t. I refer to this expected loss as "leak." 9 "Leak" is a variable that a¤ects the expected payo¤s of initial players at period t through the change of the initial CEO in period t + 2, whereas this CEO-change is dependent on the monitoring level of the new board that is determined by the initial players at period t. In short, this "leak" is controllable by the initial players. "Leak" a¤ects the initial players' expected payo¤s via two routes; one is the possibility of having "leak," and the other is the amount of "leak."The latter is measured by parameters such as the private bene…t of the CEO and the pay 8 I later show in this paper that the more the board monitors, the higher is the pro…t of the …rm. Hence more monitoring is assumed to be good in this paper. However, it is beyond the scope of this paper to analyze the socially optimum level of monitoring. 9 Refer to Sato [2006b] for the general model for "leak." each director receives. I …nd that when the board monitors, it surely raises the expected pro…t of the …rm, but at the same time increases the possibility of "leak." Hence, monitoring induces the trade-o¤ between the positive e¤ect of the expected pro…t and the negative e¤ect of the expected loss of the initial players other than monitoring cost. However, notice that the change of the board composition between t and t + 1 does not induce "leak" in the above sense, since no initial players have control over the amount given to the newly hired director. 10 I show that the monitoring level is a¤ected by the probability of having "leak" multiplied by the amount of "leak"(which is the amount of the private bene…t of the CEO for the U.S. system, and the payment to the new director for the traditional Japanese system). Therefore, in comparing the two corporate governance systems, I conclude that the Japanese system produces more intense monitoring than the U.S. system if and only if the amount of the private bene…t of the CEO is higher than the amount of the pay each director receives. The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section two describes the legal backgrounds of the two corporate governance systems. Section three provides some speci…cs on the model structure common to both governance systems. Section four discusses the U.S. model, and section …ve, the traditional Japanese model. Section six concludes.
Backgrounds
The turn of the twenty-…rst century witnessed many corporate scandals. 11 Lenient oversights, both internal and external, were not able to arrest the growth of the corruption of management.
Therefore, the monitoring of the CEO has become the central issue of the corporate governance in many countries, including the U.S. and Japan. Among the most popular suggestions is the adoption of independent directors. Despite the subtle di¤erence in the de…nition of independent directors in each nation, their presence surely provides the opportunity to separate the board from the CEO since a director cannot be independent and be manager at the same time. This paper focuses on this e¤ect induced by the independent directors and discusses whether they can enhance monitoring by the board of directors. Thus, in this section, I …rst describe some recent movements concerning independent directors.
In the U.S. the law has been established to prevent future CEO misconduct after the ac- 13 The interesting feature of the new system is that it is a copy of the U.S. system, as is discussed by Gilson and Milhaupt [2005] . 14 The law states that the boards must have committees, each committee being comprised of a majority of independent directors, whereas in the traditional system, the law does not require any presence of independent directors on the board of directors. 15 16 In this sense, the movement to adopt independent directors on the board has spread to Japan as well, but only about seventy companies that have actually switched to this system. This fact suggests that the traditional system is still more popular than the new "American" type of system and motivates me to assess the monitoring level produced by the board of the pure traditional Japanese system and American system, which would provide a certain insight to the question 12 See the standards regarding corporate governance as codi…ed in Section 303A of NYSE and NASDAQ Rule 4200 a (15) . 13 Any company that constitutes a board of directors may choose between the two systems under the Corporate Law. 14 Egashira [2004] discusses the revisions made to the Commercial Codes and states that it is an issue in contention whether the U.S. type of governance system is better than the traditional Japanese system. Sarra and Nakahigashi [2002] provide the recent amendments made to Japanese laws. 15 Corporate Law, arts. 2 [12] , 400. 16 In Japanese practice, there exists no statute that states the di¤erence between independent directors and outside directors, and therefore in practice both terminologies are used to imply almost the same thing. Outside director is de…ned in Corporate Law, art. 2 [15] , whereas independent director is not a de…ned term. also posed by Egashira [2004] .
In theory, someone from inside the company can become CEO candidate as well as someone from outside the company. Moreover, the former can be classi…ed into two groups, the board members and non-board members, such as employees. 17 I emphasize that the issue mainly argued in this paper is whether it is good to shut the channel through which the board members become CEO, so that the board can function as a pure internal oversight device. It is not the primary goal of this paper to discuss whether it is good or bad for an employee to become a CEO or a director. However, in discussing the separation of the board and the CEO, some description of the relations between the governing bodies, or between the governing bodies and employees, is helpful. Therefore, I describe some provisions regarding the corporate governance systems in the U.S. and Japan and also some practices in both countries with respect to my model in the rest of this section. 18 In the U.S. practice, according to all the above mentioned rules, the board of listed companies must be comprised of a majority of independent directors. From these rules and Gordon [2006] , it is innocuous to assume that the board of the U.S. system in my model to be comprised solely of independent directors. Since the board consists solely of independent directors, none of the board members can be the CEO succession candidate and thereby, a new CEO is always hired outside of the board. An employee cannot become an independent director until he quits and a three-to-…ve year "cooling-o¤"period has passed, so I assume directorship is always given to someone outside the company. However, an employee may become a CEO as well as someone from outside of the board. Thus, in section four, where I analyze the U.S. system, it is assumed that the CEO is always hired from outside of the board, and if the board lacks a director, a new director is hired from outside of the company.
In the traditional Japanese practice, usually successful employees become directors, and then, from among them becomes the chairman of the board, where the chairman of the board is the CEO under Japanese corporate law. [ 
Model
I begin this section with some speci…cs on the timings which are common in both governance systems. Section 3.2 explains the problems of the players. Section 3.3 states assumptions. The model is built on Hermalin and Weisbach [1998] . Speci…cally, all directors make a decision collectively, so the board of directors is regarded as one player and the monitoring level is determined by Nash bargaining between the initial board and the initial CEO. Then, the board members change after the bargaining and hence the board that actually monitors the CEO is a di¤erent board from the initial board. On the other hand, there are some notable di¤erences in extending their model to allow for a comparison of the two systems. For instance, I use discrete distribution rather than normal distribution about the CEO's ability, and also shortened the model to four stages from what they originally have seven stages, for simplicity. Another di¤erence is that I assume the number of players are always maintained at n + 1 : one CEO and n directors. Most importantly, the term "independent" in my paper is used to mean directors who cannot become CEO themselves.
Timing
There are four stages. 21 The number of directors n; and the initial board's measure of monitoring cost k 0; and the private bene…t b the CEO receives at the last stage, are exogenously given. for being H, whereas the priors for any CEO succession candidates are assumed to be precisely
for both H and L. 22 When the bargaining succeeds, both w and k 1 are endogenously determined. Wage w is paid to the CEO right after it is determined regardless of whether he will serve to the last stage.
If there is a breakdown of negotiation, I assume the initial CEO is dismissed or resigns and the board hires a new CEO. Since prior beliefs on the ability of any CEO succession candidates
for H and L, the new CEO does not have any bargaining power. Therefore, I assume that if the negotiation breaks down, the initial board determines the wage of the CEO and the new board composition. This is done by maximizing the expected payo¤ of the board assuring at least the reservation utility of the newly hired CEO. [1998] . The interpretation of the …rst three stages in their model could be the trial period, where they hire a new CEO whose ability is no di¤erent from any other CEO candidates. They let the board do the …rst update on the ability of this CEO before proceeding to Nash bargaining to give a bargaining power to the incumbent CEO, but this process can be shortened by assuming > is expressed as k 1 d( ). Then, with probability ; the board succeeds in monitoring and observes signal y 2 Y = fy H ; y L g: With probability 1
; the board fails to monitor and obtains no signal.
Third stage -The new board decides to retain the initial CEO, or …re him and hire a new CEO: The board decides to retain or …re the initial CEO depending on the signal.
23 With probability ; the board succeeds in obtaining the signal; when y H is observed (that is, the initial CEO is believed to be likely to be H) by the board, the initial CEO is retained, and …red if y L is observed (that is, the initial CEO is believed to be likely to be L). When the initial CEO is …red, a new CEO is hired. With probability 1 ; the board fails to get signal y on the initial CEO's ability and if so, it has no choice but to retain the initial CEO.
Fourth stage -The pro…t of the …rm is realized : The pro…t is a random variable denoted by e X dependent on the ability of the CEO. I denote by X the realized pro…t which belongs to fX H ; X L g where X H > X L : The board receives ' from X; speci…cally X = ' where is exogenously given and 2 (0; 1). The remaining (1 )X will be distributed to shareholders, investment, and so forth. Thus, the larger is X; the more the board meets the shareholders' expectations. Each director receives ' n as a payment, and the CEO who is serving at this last stage obtains a private bene…t of b > 0; which can be interpreted as retirement allowances, bonus, reputations, and so on.
The Players'Problems 3.2.1 The Initial CEO' s Problem
The initial CEO has no active role other than negotiating with the board about the wage and the new board composition. The initial CEO's payo¤ is w + b: Wage w is surely paid right after the negotiation, but the private bene…t b is only obtained if he serves to the fourth stage. In other words, if the initial CEO is …red prior to the last stage, he leaves without obtaining b; and his successor CEO obtains b in place of him.
The Board' s Problem
The board's problem is to maximize the pro…t of the …rm, less the disutility of monitoring and the wage it must pay to the CEO. I assume the utility of the board is
where, k l , l = 0; 1 is the average of the measure of the whole board's cost of monitoring:
The initial composition of the board whose measure of monitoring cost denoted k 0 remains the same until it is endogenously changed to k 1 through the negotiation. The disutility of monitoring is expressed as d( ) and is strictly increasing, strictly convex, twice continuously di¤erentiable
where 2 [0; 1]: The utility function for each director is expressed as i ; and it is equal to
Assumptions for Deriving the Expected Payo¤s of the Board
The relations between the pro…t of the …rm X j , j 2 fH; Lg; where X H > X L ; and the ability of the CEO a i ; i 2 fH; Lg are assumed as follows. I assume that a H stands for high ability, and a L stands for low ability. For simplicity, I assume X L = 0; but the general case where X H > X L 6 = 0 is described in detail in the Appendix. 26 I denote by P i PrfX H ja i g, a probability the CEO produces X H conditional on his high ability a i . I assume
Then, the expected pro…t of the …rm conditional on the ability of the CEO is expressed as
an expected payo¤ of the board when the CEO has 24 Each director i has his own measure of monitoring cost k i , which represents director's independency from the CEO, how experienced he is, how much information he can obtain, and etc. When the board is composed of n directors with di¤erent k i , the board measure of monitoring cost is denoted as the average of all directors' k i s: When there is a change of a director, eventually the board measure of monitoring cost changes. The smaller the k l , the less costly it is for the board to monitor the CEO. 25 I basically treat that being independent or internal does not itself bring di¤erence to k i : However, I later consider the case in which the internal directors are long-term employee and life-time guaranteed, and argue that in this case, k i of independent and internal directors di¤er in Proposition 5 where I compare the U.S. and the traditional Japanese model. 26 This is to show that I can assume X L = 0 without loss of generality.
high ability, and denote by B = P L X H ; an expected payo¤ of the board when the CEO has low ability.
At the second stage, the new board chooses monitoring level : If the board does not succeed in monitoring (which occurs with probability 1 ), then the initial CEO's ability would not be updated and hence the expected pro…t of the board is expressed as ' I A + (1 )B, where is the prior probability of the initial CEO's ability being H and is higher than : If the board succeeds in monitoring (with probability ), it observes signal y 2 fy H ; y L g. I denote by j Pr (a H jy = y j ) ; the posterior probability that the CEO has ability a H conditional on the observation of y by Bayes'rule. I assume L < 1 2 , and H > > : The expected pro…t of the board at this point is expressed as j A + (1 j )B which I denote by ' j E(Xjy = y j ): I denote by Z for the probability of the board observing y H for an initial CEO whose prior is ; and denote by (1 Z) for the probability of observing y L for the same initial CEO. The expected pro…t of the board conditional on an entirely new CEO is denoted ' N; where ' N Table 1 . In the …rst stage, the priors about the initial CEO's talent is : When the board keeps this CEO to the fourth stage without any monitoring (or fails to monitor), it would bring the board the expected payo¤ of ' I : When the board monitors and observes y H with probability Z; the posterior belief about the CEO's ability is updated and hence the expected payo¤ of the board becomes ' H . In this case, the board retains the CEO. When the board observes y L with probability (1 Z), the initial CEO is …red because the expected pro…t of the board conditional on his ability becomes ' L ; which is lower than ' N (the expected pro…t of the board conditional on the new CEO). Therefore, if the board observes y H ; it retains the initial CEO but if it observes y L ; it …res the initial CEO and hires a new CEO. Table 1 Signal y
Expected payo¤ of the board
Next, I describe some o¤-the-path of equilibrium assumptions for the case where the nego-tiation breaks down in the …rst stage. As described in section 3.1, if there is no negotiation the initial board alone decides the wage and the new board composition. I denote by j the posterior probability that the newly hired CEO has ability H conditional on the observation of signal j after the initial board monitors: The expected pro…t at this point is expressed as
where j = H; L: I assume 1 2 < H < H : I denote by Q the probability of the board observing y H for a new CEO whose prior ability is 1 2 for both H and L, and therefore (1 Q) is the probability of the board observing y L for the same CEO. I assume
4 The U.S. System
The Expected Value of the Board
The utility for the U.S. board at stage two is expressed as
The …rst term of the above expression is the expected payo¤ after successful monitoring: with probability U ; the board succeeds in monitoring and then with probability Z, the board observes a good signal y H and retains the initial CEO who would bring ' H to the board, and with probability (1 Z), the board observes a bad signal y L and replaces the initial CEO and hires a new CEO who would bring ' N to the board. The second term is the payo¤ after the board failed to monitor the CEO with probability (1 U ): In this case the initial CEO is retained without being monitored, so the board will receive ' I . The third term is the cost of monitoring, and the fourth term is the wage it must pay to the CEO. The utility U is concave in U . The board chooses the monitoring level so as to maximize U : Thus, the …rst-order condition with
The above expression is su¢ cient as well as necessary. De…ne U k 1 to be the solution to (6) . Furthermore, by di¤erentiating (6) with respect to k 1 , I have 
Nash Bargaining
When they enter into negotiation, the board brings;
Recall that, Nash bargaining stage is at stage one, so the players are the initial CEO and the initial board whose measure of monitoring cost is k 0 : After the bargaining, the board member is changed due to the exchange of directors, and this new board's measure of monitoring cost is expressed as k 1 : In other words, the board that decides the new board composition and the board that later monitors the CEO is di¤erent. This is the reason why the third term is expressed as
The …fth term, U 0; is the reservation utility, and is the expected payo¤ if it hires a replacement CEO.
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On the other hand, the initial CEO brings;
where the outside opportunity of the initial CEO is assumed to be 0: The threat point is in the interior of the feasible set so they enter into negotiation. 28 The board and the CEO choose the optimum k 1 and w U to maximize the following Nash product;
27 See the Appendix for the threat point of the U.S. board, Proposition 2 The equilibrium level of monitoring for the U.S. system is expressed as
The implication of this proposition is that the level of monitoring U is negatively related to the private bene…t b under the U.S. governance system. That is, the higher is the private bene…t of the CEO, the less the board monitors under the U.S. system. Since I assume no existing director on the U.S. board is a CEO succession candidate, if the initial CEO is …red, a new CEO is hired from outside of the incumbent board. This implies the private bene…t b will be given to a new CEO with probability (1 Z), leaving the expected loss of b to the initial players. This is the "leak." The higher is b; the higher is the amount of "leak"to the new CEO. To avoid this "leak," the board decreases the monitoring level to increase the probability that the initial CEO is kept. Hence, when b becomes high, the board acts in a way to reduce the monitoring level under the U.S. system. 30 This …nding is consistent with the fact even before the establishment of Sarbanes-Oxley acts, the CEOs were elected from outside the incumbent board members, but still could not prevent management abuses. 31 This is because the private bene…t of CEOs are extremely high in the U.S. 32 Therefore, if a company wishes to raise monitoring levels under the U.S. system, what needs to be done is to reduce the amount of private bene…t of the CEO, rather than simply increasing the absolute number or the ratio of independent directors on the board. 29 The proof is in the Appendix. 30 See the graph for the U.S. system in Figure two 5 The Traditional Japanese System
The Expected Value of the Board
The utility of the traditional Japanese board at stage two is expressed as
where (11) is as (5) except the …rst term. The …rst term, J Z ' H + (1 Z)
' N + b is the expected payo¤ when the monitoring succeeds. Speci…cally, a good signal y H is observed with probability Z, and then the board obtains ' H : When a bad signal y L is observed with probability (1 Z), then the initial CEO is …red; that is, one of the board members becomes a new CEO and receives b, and the remaining n 1 directors receive ' N n . Thus, the payo¤ to the board is
Recall that the number of the CEO and the directors are always maintained at n + 1: in the traditional Japanese system, the law states that CEO must be the chairman of the board, and hence if they dismiss the incumbent CEO, one of the directors usually becomes the new CEO and the new chairman of the board. To maintain the total number at n + 1, usually they hire a new director by promoting an employee to the board of directors.
The optimum level of monitoring is derived by the …rst-order condition with respect to J ;
The above expression is su¢ cient as well as necessary. De…ne 
Nash Bargaining
Just like the U.S. system, the initial board and the initial CEO enter into negotiation. 33 The board brings;
where (13) is as (7) . The reservation utility of the Japanese board is expressed as J 0 , and this is the expected payo¤ if the board would hire a replacement CEO. 34 On the other hand, the CEO brings; h
where the outside opportunity is assumed to be 0. 35 The threat point is in the interior of the feasible set so they enter into negotiation. 36 The CEO and the board choose k 1 and w J to 33 Unlike the U.S. system, where executives decide their own wages by themselves, in Japan, the law states that they must be decided in general meetings or must be stated in corporate statutes. [Corporate Law, art. 361.] However, usually shareholders only ratify the slate put forward by the board of directors, and hence it is quite natural for a board and a CEO to negotiate in advance. 34 See the Appendix for the threat point of the traditional Japanese board, J 0 . 35 In Japanese practice, when a CEO resigns without causing serious damage while on duty, he is often given an alternative post in the company. Under the current law, he may become one of the inside directors and remain on the board, or he may be given a post out of the board, such as an advisor.
See the Supreme Court decision of 20 Dec, 1966, 20-10, min-syu, 2160. In such cases, the reservation utility of the incumbent CEO is not 0. When the CEO remains on the board, his reservation utility becomes that of the directors, but when he becomes an advisor, he receives some …xed amount. To discuss the former case, another model is required, but it is more natural in practice that once a CEO has resigned, he either leaves the company or is given a post out of the board (e.g. an advisor). Therefore, it is innocuous to assume that the reservation utility for the CEO is 0 for simplicity. 36 The proof is in the Appendix.
I de…ne k 1 and w Proposition 4 The equilibrium level of monitoring for the traditional Japanese system is expressed as
The implication of this proposition is that the number of directors and the monitoring level are positively related. That is, the smaller the size of the board, the less the board monitors under the traditional Japanese system. Under the traditional Japanese system where the board and the CEO are related to each other, the CEO succession candidate is limited to the directors.
Then, when the initial CEO is …red, one of the directors surely becomes the next CEO and one of the long term employees is promoted to a directorship: This implies, with probability of (1 Z); a share of ' N n from the whole board payo¤ ' N , will be paid to the new director giving the same amount of "leak"to the initial directors. Thus, when n is small, "leak"becomes large, and hence the board acts to decrease the monitoring level to increase the probability that the initial CEO is kept.
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This proves that as a system, the traditional Japanese system does function in terms of monitoring. Traditionally, Japanese companies tend to have larger boards than U.S. companies, but because of the other problems caused by having large boards, some companies are run ine¢ ciently. Many lawyers, policy makers, and medias have simply attributed the cause of ine¢ ciency to the lack of independent directors, but I emphasize that this is not always true.
Proposition 4 suggests that if companies wish to raise monitoring levels, the size of the board n must be maintained or be increased in order not to increase "leak" under the traditional 37 The proof is in the Appendix. 38 See the graph for Japanese system in Figure two .
Japanese system. Although increasing the number of the directors surely induces the Japanese board to produce strong monitoring in the model, in practice it incurs some costs that are not discussed in the model. For example, it could slow down the decision-making of the board, and it could render each director's conduct obscure. More importantly, although increase of n reduces the "leak" each player bears, it may reduce the amount each director receives as well.
However, since the increase in monitoring levels surely raises the corporate value X; the amount each director receives may not decrease as compared to the case where n is small if the marginal increase in X is larger enough. The problem that may arise if it does reduce the amount of pay each director receives is that they will try to increase their payments in a di¤erent way. Say, directors might raise the fraction of the share the board receives from the corporate pro…t X:
That is, in my model, the board might raise ; which would leave the amount of (1 )X small, and may decrease the amount shareholders receive. Given all these arguments, in practice, the cost of increasing n is not trivial and it may not be easy to increase the number of directors.
Increasing the number of directors may incur some other problems, such as free rider problem as well.
Furthermore, the Proposition 4 gives an insight into the recent legislation in Japan. As discussed in the background section of this paper, in 2002 the Japanese Commercial Codes were amended to give some companies a choice of governance structure of the traditional Japanese system or the new Japanese system referred to as "Companies with Committees." The new system encourages companies to have smaller boards with independent directors. However, not only those companies that chose to adopt the new system, but also the companies who chose to stick with the traditional system are reducing the number of directors as well. They are decreasing the number of directors but instead have created a special post of "corporate o¢ cers," who do not legally serve on the board but do receive a certain amount of share of pro…ts of the …rm, just as other directors do. 39 This implies the recent practice in Japanese …rms to reduce the number of directors may render internal oversights weak. 40 Compensating those who are deprived of a director's post with a new post as "corporate o¢ cers" does not induce the board to produce stronger monitoring. This is because the total amount of "leak" remains the same (that is, a payment of 1 n ' N to a new director remains the same), but the 39 "Corporate o¢ cers" referred to as Shikkou-yakuin are neither director nor CEO. Their primary job is said to be executing the decisions made by the board of directors. Interested readers are referred to Sarra and Nakahigashi [2002] and Morimoto [2003] . 40 The proof is in the Appendix.
amount of "leak" for each player bears becomes larger. Therefore, the level of monitoring may become worse. Although simply increasing the number of directors incurs some trade-o¤s argued in the above paragraph, it can be said that reducing the directors and creating a post of "corporate o¢ cers"has no such trade-o¤ and is not a sensible policy. Lastly, there is a way to completely eliminate "leak"under the traditional Japanese system.
Those companies that wish to do so should not …ll the vacancy caused on the board by promoting an employee to a directorship. To be more speci…c, the vacancy is derived from a promotion of one of the initial directors to be the new CEO after the initial CEO was …red. This means that, even if the initial CEO were deprived of his title as CEO, if he could serve on the board as one of the inside director to …ll in the vacancy, this would entirely eliminate the "leak." As mentioned earlier, in Japanese practice, retired CEOs usually remain in the company anyway.
They may be given a special title, such as advisor, but not belong to management or the board. Since a retired CEO is not forbidden to serve on the board, it would be much more e¢ cient if he were given a post as one of the internal directors rather than an advisor, so that vacancy created to the board would not be …lled with non-initial members. However, it must be noted that although this would eliminate "leak," it may deprive the incentives of employees to work hard. It has often been said that Japanese workers are hard working and loyal to the company because they could be the one to become the CEO in the future. I do not go into detail, but it must be stressed that this trade-o¤ is not trivial in Japanese corporate governance system. Next, I compare the level of monitoring between the U.S. system and the traditional Japanese system which leads to the following proposition:
Proposition 5
1. Suppose b < 1 n ' N ; that is the private bene…t b is su¢ ciently low, or the size of the board n is su¢ ciently small. Then for all levels of monitoring cost k 1 ; the board of the U.S. system monitors the incumbent CEO more intensely than the board of the traditional Japanese system; U k 1 > J k 1 : Suppose next b > 1 n ' N ; then for all levels of measure of monitoring cost k 1 , the opposite is true;
2. Moreover, the monitoring cost k 1 di¤ers between the two systems. When b < ' N n , it is less costly for the board of the U.S. system to monitor versus the board of the traditional Japanese system; k
traditional Japanese system produces far more intensive monitoring than the U.S. system;
Then, by comparing (10) and (16) , the greater the right-hand side, the greater is the level of monitoring. Holding …xed k 1 of both the U.S. and the traditional Japanese system at the same level, it is obvious that U k 1 > J k 1 holds when b is smaller than ' N n , and U k 1 < J k 1 holds when b is larger than
k 1 may be the same level in both systems, but usually they are di¤erent. In the U.S. system, from (6) and (10), k 1 is calculated as
In the traditional Japanese system, from (12) and (16), k 1 is calculated as
Then, when b > ' N n ; (17) is larger than (18) , and when b < ' N n ; the opposite is true. 3: Hence, when b > ' N n holds, from (10), (16) , (17) , and (18), the traditional Japanese system produces far more intensive monitoring than the U.S. system. When b < ' N n holds, the U.S. system produces far more intensive monitoring than the traditional Japanese system. Proposition 5 has two important implications. First, despite the recent amendments in the laws in both countries to separate boards from management, the board consists entirely of internal directors may produce stronger monitoring than the board that consists entirely of independent directors. Propositions 2 and 4 prove that monitoring levels are a¤ected by "leak"in each system and therefore a comparison of monitoring levels is done by comparing two "leaks" as shown in Proposition 5. Although the magnitude of each "leak" is given exogenously by parameters, the type of "leak"is determined by whom they have for CEO succession candidates in both corporate governance systems. That is, if the board is related to the CEO, as in the traditional Japanese system, "leak" is derived as a result of appointing a new director chosen from employee, who …ll the vacancy caused by one of the initial directors promoted to a new CEO, but if the board is separate from the CEO as in the U.S. system "leak" is derived as a result of hiring a new CEO from outside of the board. Hence, if a company wishes to strengthen the board monitoring, it should decrease the number of independent directors when b > ' N n holds, and increase the number of independent directors when b < ' N n holds. Second, Proposition 5 explains one of the reasons why some Japanese companies monitor less even when they have large board consists entirely of internal directors. It is clear from Propositions 2, 4, and 5, that as a system, the traditional Japanese system functions as well as the U.S. system. However, the di¤erence lies in the parameter k 0 , which is the measure of monitoring costs for the initial board, and is exogenously given and treated as equal in both the U.S. and the traditional Japanese models. In practice, they are not the same. When k 0 is the same in both systems, the right-hand sides of (17) and (18) This has a psychological e¤ect on the Japanese directors and in the model it can be interpreted as higher k 0 as compared to that of the U.S. Given these facts, I show how the di¤erence in k 0 a¤ects the monitoring levels. I …rst focus on the case where b > ' N n : From Proposition 5, if k 0 is …xed at the same level, (17) > (18) holds, which suggests it is more costly for the board of the U.S. system to monitor the CEO. However, if k 0 of the traditional system is larger than that of the U.S. system, this inequality may reverse. That is, even if (16) > (10) holds, the Japanese system may yield weak monitoring. Next, I focus on the case where b < ' N n : In this case, it is obvious that if k 0 in the traditional system is large, what is provided in Proposition 5 is even more stressed. This is why it is perceived by many that the boards of the Japanese system produce relatively weak monitoring.
Conclusion
In this paper, I compare two corporate governance systems for monitoring the CEO; a system in which the board consists entirely of independent directors and a system where the board consists of no independent directors. In the former system, I assume all the directors on the board are independent directors and none of them are allowed to become CEO, and hence the CEO is always recruited from outside the board. In the latter system, in addition to the as-sumption that independent directors are nonexistent on the board, which is common in Japanese practice, the law states that the CEO must be elected from the board of directors, and hence in the model the channel to become CEO is only through the board of directors. Conventional wisdom on monitoring is that the board that has a majority of independent directors produces more monitoring than the board without any independent directors because of the separation of management and the monitoring device. If this is true, the U.S. type of boards would always monitor the CEO with more e¤ective scrutiny than the traditional Japanese type of boards.
However, in this paper I show that this is not necessarily true. I assume that independent directors and internal directors incur the same cost in monitoring, but show that the existence of independent directors a¤ects the candidate for CEO: whether to appoint a new CEO from inside of the board or outside of the board. This di¤erence a¤ects the type of "leak," which is the key variable in determining monitoring levels. Therefore one system is not always superior to the other, or in other words, separation of management and the board is not the only way to ensure strong monitoring.
The addition of (5) and (8) is
From (4), it is clear that (20)< (21) 
Therefore, the feasible set is in the interior of the addition of the players' utilities.
q.e.d.
Proof of Proposition 2: (10)
The …rst-order condition maximizing V U with respect to k 1 yields
The …rst-order condition maximizing V U with respect to w U yields
Solving for w U yields
Substitute (24) 
The threat point of the traditional Japanese board
The threat point of the traditional Japanese board, J 0 ; is expressed as
where 0 J is the optimum level of monitoring chosen by the board when its measure of monitoring cost is k 1 , and hence 0 J is a function of k 1 : The …rst term 0 J Q (n 1)
' N H n + b is the expected payo¤ to the initial board members when the monitoring succeeds and a good signal is observed, and the third term (1
+ b is the expected payo¤ when there is no monitoring at all. In both terms, the initial CEO leaves his post after the breakdown of negotiation, and at that point one of the directors is promoted to be the new CEO. However, when the board either observes a good signal (the …rst term), or does not monitor in the later stages (the third term), there will be no more changes of players after that. Thus, one of them surely receives b; and the remaining n 1 directors receive
each. The second term is the expected payo¤ when monitoring succeeds but observes a bad signal. Here, one of the initial directors is already promoted to a CEO, and the remaining n 1 directors are on the board with one new director promoted from among the employees. Then, if the new director becomes a CEO with probability of 1 n ; the remaining initial directors receive (n 1)
; but if one of the remaining initial directors becomes a CEO with probability n 1 n ; one of them surely receives b; but the remaining n 2 will receive ' N n : Therefore, the expected payo¤ is expressed as 1 n (n 1)
The fourth term is the wage w J 0 ;
and this equals
b, because the initial board alone decides both the wage and the new board composition as to maximize its expected payo¤ subject to at least assuring the reservation utility of the newly hired CEO, who has no bargaining power. 42 The last term is the cost of monitoring.
Proof of participation constraint for the negotiation in the traditional Japanese system
The addition of the threat points for the board and the CEO is
The addition of (11) and (14) yields
From ( that the point that maximizes G J ( ) is larger than or equal to G J ( 0 ): Therefore, the feasible set is in the interior of the addition of the players'utilities.
Proof of Proposition 4: (16)
The …rst-order condition maximizing V J with respect to k 1 yields,
The …rst-order condition maximizing V J with respect to w J yields,
Proof of "Corporate o¢ cers" may render internal oversights weak.
For simplicity, I assume that the number of directors are reduced to one-half. By reducing the number of board would reduce the pro…t of the …rm, but do not reduce the amount of payment which will be paid to the new director. In other words, "leak" of for both being H and L: The pro…t of the …rm is denoted X j , j 2 fH; Lg; where X H > X L : Then the conditional probability of outcome dependent on the ability of the CEO, a i ; i 2 fH; Lg is expressed as P i j
PrfX j ja i g. I assume that a H stands for high ability and a L stands for low ability. For example, P H L is the probability that the CEO produces X L conditional on his high ability a H . See Table A.   Table A a 
On the other hand, if a new CEO is hired and serves to the end, the board's expected payo¤ is expressed as
Below, I show that when the board monitors, the above mentioned expected payo¤s change due to updates of CEO's ability. See Table B . 
I denote the signal the board observes as y 2 fy H ; y L g; and the conditional probability of payo¤ dependent on the ability of the CEO is expressed as R i j = Prfy j ja i g. This is given exogenously, but notice that it does not appear in my model since it is only used to derive the posterior ability of the CEO by Bayes'rule. When the board monitors and observes y H ; then it believes that the CEO is likely to have high ability with probability of :), to imply that the monitoring raises the expected outcome of the …rm if the initial CEO is believed to be likely to be H. Likewise,
; and this is assumed to be
): Given these assumptions, the board's expected payo¤ would be expressed as
if the board observes y H with probability Z, and,
if the board observes y L with probability (1 Z). From above arguments, ' H > ' I > ' N > ' L can be derived even when I assume X L = 0 for simplicity.
q.e.d. 
